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National electric grids in Europe have been interconnected since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, a long time before the European Union (EU) was born and started 
building a single energy market. The primary reason for interconnections is security: 
the more national grids expand, the more national electric systems need to be 
interconnected to provide one another mutual assistance. Alongside the building of 
the EU, the European cross-border transmission sector has been organized through 
various national operators’ associations. The evolution of the Union for the 
Coordination of Production and Transmission of Electricity (UCPTE) illustrates this 
process. Created in 1951, the UCPTE gathered all the electric operators of Western 
Europe to create a widely interconnected power grid. In 1999 the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic became full members of the UCPTE. 
Meanwhile, in 1999 market liberalization prompted the separation of transmission 
activity from generation and retail operations. Consequently, the UCPTE became the 
Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE).  
To guarantee the security of supply and networks, the EU added the objective 
of integrating national energy markets into one single energy market. Indeed, starting 
from 1996, the European authorities have published a series of directives and 
regulations aimed at instituting a free European electricity market in which 
consumers will be able to choose their favorite suppliers in a competitive setting.1 To 
this end, the European authorities dismantled vertically integrated monopolies by 
separating production and supply, which are potentially competitive, from 
transmission and distribution, which are inherently natural monopolies. To 
guarantee free grid access to all suppliers in return for access tariffs, and to avoid 
cross-subsidies and distortions of competition, firms maintaining integrated 
ownership have to keep separated internal accounts and management for each 
transmission and distribution activity. Network activities have to be managed by 
independent entities: distribution system operators (DSOs) are now in charge of 
distribution transformers and lines while transmission system operators (TSOs) are 
responsible for the transmission network and the interconnections as well as the 
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operation of the electric system. For instance, Réseau de Transport d’Electricité 
(RTE) is the TSO in France, National Grid is the main TSO in Great Britain, Red 
Eléctrica de España operates in Spain, and so on. Interconnections have a key role to 
play in favoring competition as they allow to benefit from the advantages of 
complementary generation mix as well as heterogeneous demand profiles. Second, to 
accompany the liberalization process and to keep the newly dismantled monopolies 
under close scrutiny, Directive 2003/54/EC2 requires the setting up of independent 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs), such as the Commission de Régulation de 
l’Energie (CRE) in France, the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) in 
Great Britain, the Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) in Spain, and so on.  
Despite the efforts of these regulatory bodies, several accidents and ongoing 
problems have shown that the common market is still far from being achieved and 
that the current organizational structure does not guarantee a reliable supply. A 
striking example is the blackout that occurred on November 4, 2006, when an 
overload of a German power network triggered chain reactions of outages across 
Western Europe, leaving 10 million Europeans without electricity. The German utility 
provider E.ON unexpectedly turned off the 380,000-volt line it operates over the 
river Ems to allow a ship to pass through safely.3 The regulatory consequences of 
such an accident were summarized by Sir John Mogg, president of the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER): “This recent blackout demonstrates the need, 
now more than ever, for an integrated European electricity grid subject to proper 
regulatory oversight. We need new legislation that formally mandates the TSOs to 
cooperate and we must have effective unbundling that would facilitate proper 
exchange of information.”4  
The Third Legislative Energy Package5 adopted by the European authorities 
(2009), constitutes the EU’s response to a lack of cooperation among TSOs in efforts 
to guarantee the security of supply and complete the European energy market. The 
package identifies interconnection as key to the creation of a common market. 
Consequently, the EU authorities aim at organizing an efficient cross-border 
transmission sector for Europe. To do so, the new legislation gives additional 
responsibilities to national TSOs and NRAs while creating a European regulator for 
interconnections, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),6 as 
well as a European association of TSOs, the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). 
The new regulatory framework for interconnection raises several economic 
issues that will be developed later on. As described above, both national and 
European regulators scrutinize the TSOs’ activities. Each organization has powers 
that affect the TSOs’ decisions on interconnection. The theory of multiprincipals7 
provides a useful tool-box when studying the interacting incentives designed by these 
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different regulators. The subsidiarity principle,8 according to which decentralization 
is desirable unless it entails too high coordination costs and too little internalization, 
is also helpful in assessing the proper level of decentralization. 
In section 4.1 we analyze the hierarchical regulatory structure created by the 
Third Energy Package through a study of the powers attributed to each actor and a 
modeling of the actors’ relationships (the analysis is based on an article by Caillaud, 
Jullien, and Picard, 1996). The main conclusion is that it is always optimal to 
decentralize part or all of the provision of incentive policies. In section 4.2, we 
consider the possibility of mergers between national TSOs and the subsequent likely 
development of international TSOs with stakes in several countries under separated 
regulation mechanisms. We discuss how the regulatory structure should evolve and 
how the relationships between an international TSO and its regulator(s) could be 
altered. Our analysis relies on an article by Laffont and Pouyet (2003), who discuss 
the role of shareholders and lobbyists in the regulation process. To conclude, we 
suggest some topics for further research. 
 
4.1 The Regulatory Hierarchy of the European Cross-
Border Transmission Sector 
In this section, we assess the current regulatory hierarchy of the European cross-
border transmission sector. We first look at the powers granted by the Third Energy 
Package to national and European regulators overseeing cross-border transmission 
activity. We then discuss the interactions between the incentives supplied by national 
and European regulators and their impacts on TSO decisions on interconnection. 
Finally, we sketch a model of how to design regulation mechanisms when the 
regulation authority faces moral hazard and potential capture.  
4.1.1 National and International Regulators 
This subsection consists in a presentation of the regulatory principals we examine 
later on. We first show how the Third Energy Package enhances the powers of 
national regulatory agencies to regulate interconnection. Then, we present the 
functions of the new European regulator for interconnection.  
Enhanced powers for national regulation authorities 
Through a directive on the internal rules for electricity markets, the Third Energy 
Package enhances NRAs’ role in cross-border issues. For instance, NRAs, already in 
charge of monitoring TSO compliance with the guidelines for management of 
congestion and interconnection, also assess TSOs’ investment plans and their 
consistency with the Europe-wide 10-year development plan elaborated by the 
ENTSO-E.  
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Furthermore, the NRAs are explicitly required to cooperate more at the 
European level. Notice that the NRAs already cooperate, thanks to several structures 
such as the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). The 
ERGEG was created in 2003 by the European Commission as an advisory body. It is 
composed of representatives of the NRAs. Through the ERGEG, the NRAs advise the 
Commission with the objective of consolidating the internal electricity market. 
Regardless of efforts that have led to a convergence of views,9 the main weakness of 
the institution, which works on a voluntary basis, is that it follows a constrained 
decision-making process in which 27 regulators have to agree with one another.  
Regulating Interconnection 
After several years of debate about the appropriate regulatory structure to deal with 
cross-border issues, the European Commission has opted for an independent body. 
Till now, the regulation of interconnections was performed by the national regulators 
only. The Third Energy Package set up the ACER to complement and coordinate the 
regulatory tasks performed at the national level by the regulatory authorities.  
The ACER supports NRAs in their efforts to cooperate. It also monitors and 
reviews the activities of the ENTSO-E. In particular, the ACER is involved in 
providing its opinion on the priorities of the TSOs’ 10-year network development plan  
and in the preparation of technical and market codes. Furthermore, it has individual 
decision-making power over cross-border issues as well as a general advisory role in 
the European Commission, in continuity with the ERGEG’s functions. 
The role of ACER will probably evolve in the next few years, most likely 
gaining more power to the detriment of the NRAs. Is this a good thing or is 
decentralized regulation a better option? We now discuss this design problem. 
4.1.2 Regulation Design of National TSOs 
The question of choosing between a unique European agency and a set of national 
agencies, or a combination of both, to regulate a given economic sector was addressed 
in several fields before the problem arose in the electricity transport sector. For 
example, Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1996) ground the theoretical model we discuss 
in the following paragraphs in the organization of both the Common Agricultural 
Policy and European research and development (R&D) policy. The regulatory 
framework the authors work within is very similar to the one proposed in the Third 
Energy Package regarding cross-border issues. They address the question of how to 
balance the regulation process in a national-international hierarchical structure when 
the national entities are better informed than the international entity, and when the 
national firms create externalities out of the scope of the national regulators. 
                                                 
9
 See for example ERGEG (2008), "ERI Coherence and Convergence Report - An ERGEG Conclusions Paper", E08-ERI-12-
04, www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/CLOSED%20PUBLIC%20CONSULTATIONS/ELECTR
ICITY/ERI%20Coherence%20and%20Convergence/CD/E08-ERI-12-04_CCR-CP_2008-02-15.pdf 
 5 
Spillover Internalization vs. Informational Opportunism 
The hierarchical structure 
The regulatory pyramid analyzed by Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1996) is made up 
of one European regulatory agency (ERA) and a set of national regulation agencies, 
each of which in charge of controlling one national monopoly. This regulatory 
structure is quite representative of that current for the transport of electricity. 
Indeed, the European regulation agency can be associated with the ACER, the 
national sector regulators can be viewed as the NRAs, and the natural monopolies 
could be the TSOs. We may note that in countries where there are several TSOs, for 
example, in Germany, the operators have regional prerogatives and so behave like 
monopolies. As compared with the real world of electricity transport, several 
important actors are missing, in particular the national governments, the European 
Commission, and the ENTSO-E. 
Externalities and spillover effects 
The central question is whether TSOs’ decision making has effects out of the scope of 
their profit function. Were private and social objectives positively related, there 
would be no reason to regulate firms (in this case, TSOs). That said, there is a general 
discrepancy between the private profit derived through the decisions of regulated 
TSOs and social welfare.  
To explain the gap between the private and the social levels of effort in the 
industry we analyze, notice that all agents do not give the same value to the energy 
internationally transported, and they do not give the same value to interconnection 
capacities either. For instance, a vertically integrated firm that owns both 
transmission and generation assets has little interest in investing in cross-border 
infrastructure if it anticipates energy imports. Indeed, investing would make it easier 
for potential challengers to enter such a firm’s home market. By contrast, national 
and European consumers value such investments because they increase the security 
of supply and make mutual assistance easier in case of domestic failure, even though 
interconnection makes electricity more expensive in the exporting countries.10 Notice 
also that beside the European dimension of an integrated energy market, European 
foreign policy is at stake. For instance, the Mediterranean network project, which 
aims to link the European grid to the Mediterranean countries over a distance of 
8,000 kilometers, is highly valued by some European actors.11  
When there are several decision makers with the same objective but different 
levels of information, the only problem is how to pool the scattered information 
(Marshack and Radner, 1972). By contrast, in the context of electricity transport, 
divergent interests arise both from externalities (e.g. local congestion) and from 
spillover effects that are internalized neither by the NRAs nor by the TSOs (e.g. loop 
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flows). The first type of discrepancy is rather common, whereas the second comes 
from international by-products of national decisions. For example, because of loop 
flows, the decision to reinforce a domestic transport line can adversely affect the 
electricity flows in interconnections and, consequently, modify welfare in the 
neighboring countries.  
The informational structure 
The basic assumption of the model discussed here is that some actions of the TSOs 
under scrutiny cannot be verified by the regulator(s), which is a matter of moral 
hazard. This means that regulation contracts cannot be based on these actions since 
the real decisions taken by the agent cannot be checked ex post.  
On top of an informational asymmetry in favor of the TSOs, the model 
supposes that the national regulators have an informational advantage over the ERA. 
Several reasons can explain this information gap. Mere geographical location makes 
it more difficult for the ACER to observe the TSOs’ actions. Moreover, the new 
legislation enables national regulators to keep the TSOs’ activities under scrutiny. To 
limit market abuse, national regulators have access to the firms’ operational decisions 
up to five years after such decisions are made. Meanwhile, national regulators have 
been working with TSOs since the year 2000, whereas the ACER is just starting out. 
Other similarities and divergences between the model and real life will be discussed 
later on.  
As the actions of TSOs are hidden, the regulation mechanism can be based 
only on observable states of the world (for example the duration of blackouts) or 
signals (for example the number of complaints) that are partially generated by hidden 
actions and are publicly observable. The model we discuss here is based on the 
existence of signals. For instance, when a TSO increases its (unobservable) 
maintenance effort on the interconnections it manages, the NRAs and ERA can 
merely observe that the network users are more satisfied or that fewer complaints are 
received. Moreover, as the NRAs have an informational advantage over the ERA, each 
NRA receives an additional signal that is not correlated with the one received at the 
Community level (see our illustration in figure 4.1). The probability that each NRA 
receives a signal of good performance increases with the effort of the TSO under its 
jurisdiction.  
Bargaining power 
A more disputable assumption of the model when applied to electricity transport is 
the one concerning relative bargaining power: the ERA is supposed to have strong 
bargaining power against the TSOs since it proposes a system of subsidies that can 
only be accepted or rejected. National regulators, by contrast, have to negotiate their 
policy with the TSOs. Since the ACER is a new institution, this is obviously not (yet) 
the case. Nevertheless, the idea that Community decisions are easier to enforce than 
national decisions is increasingly true across the EU. Additionally, the modeling of 
the relationship between each NRA and the corresponding regulated TSO by means 
of a bargaining process can be interpreted as a modeling of the degree of capture of 
the national regulator, that is how much the NRA depends on the TSO's private 
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interest.12 In other words, it is obviously more difficult for national TSOs to capture a 
European entity than to capture the national regulators.  
Financial flows 
Consider now the financial flows under the control of the ERA. The ERA is entirely 
financed ex ante by member states’ participation fees, and it must balance its budget. 
The regulatory instruments it controls are twofold: they consist of direct incentive 
transfers (subsidies from the ERA to the TSOs), and compensatory transfers between 
countries (transfers to the NRAs). Transfers from European institutions to the NRAs 
and TSOs to foster cross-border investments do exist—for example the inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism.13 International transactions may be carried out by 
network operators in several member states. The TSOs concerned by energy flows 
resulting from the transactions incur extra costs on their networks. The inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism is an annual voluntary scheme aimed at compensating 
such extra costs. It has been operated since 2002 and is organized according to the 
EC Regulation 1228/2003: “It supports the development of the single electricity 
market by ensuring that decisions on cross-border trade and on plant location and 
retirement are not distorted and that the costs of the transmission infrastructure are 
recovered from those responsible for its use.”  
 The Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E) is another mechanism. The EU 
contributes to electricity transmission infrastructure projects of European interest. 
An annual budget of €25 million is spent for financing studies. The project between 
France and Spain is an example.14  
 Even though such schemes are not directly the responsibility of the ACER, we 
can imagine that the ERA would provide similar incentives to develop the 
interconnections. On the one hand, constrained by a balanced budget condition, the 
ERA modeled by Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1996) asks member states to 
contribute to financing transfers. On the other hand, the states receive compensatory 
transfers to internalize the spillover effects. This is quite representative of the budget 
of the ACER. The Agency’s annual costs will be covered by Community grants. The 
Agency has limited revenues stemming from fees to be paid by third parties charged 
when the Agency takes certain decisions.15 
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Figure 4.1 Financial and informational flows in the national TSOs game 
 
Note: NRA = national regulation agency; ERA = European regulation agency; TSO = transmission system operator. 
As we already noted, in the regulation game with hidden action by the agent, the only 
feasible regulatory instruments are monetary transfers based on signals supposedly 
positively correlated with the intensity of the effort devoted to efficiency progress. At 
the national level, each NRA determines the transfer to the TSO it regulates. National 
transfers are financed through a tax on corporate profit (including a direct subsidy 
from the ERA). They are also financed by consumers paying their electricity bills, and 
this generates a dead-weight loss due to the cost of public funds. 
Alternative scenarios  
Given the assumptions and the institutional setting presented above, Caillaud et al. 
contrast the social effects of three possible scenarios: 
• Full decentralization (that is, the green portions of figure 4.1 are not present): 
NRAs enjoy informational advantages but are constrained to bargain with the 
TSOs to implement their national policies, and do not take spillover effects into 
account .  
• Full centralization (that is, the red portions of figure 4.1 are not present): the ERA 
is able to internalize the spillover effects but suffers from an informational 
disadvantage. In this scenario, the ACER would be endowed with all the powers of 
the NRAs. Note that this alternative is rejected by many governments, who fear 
losing their sovereignty. This rejection is in line with Caillaud et al. who show that 
“full centralization at the Community level is never optimal from the aggregate 
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point of view as soon as national regulators have an informational advantage” 
(ibid: 94).  
• Partial (de)centralization. Because national and community policies are 
complementary, the partial decentralization scenario is generically the best 
solution, even though full decentralization may be optimal if the informational 
advantage of national regulators is large and they have sufficient bargaining 
power.  
 
Moral Hazard and Risk of Capture 
Several useful lessons can be derived from this analysis. 
First, regarding informational rent, the optimal contracts signed by the ERA, 
followed by national negotiations, lead to suboptimal decisions by the TSOs. This is 
because the moral hazard problems faced by the ERA and the NRAs imply that a rent 
be left to the TSOs, which causes a social loss. The TSOs are able to extract some rent 
during the national negotiation process, since the NRAs do not have full bargaining 
power (that is, they are partially captured). To put it in other words, moral hazard 
and potential capture are the sources of TSO rents. The trade-off between full 
efficiency and rent minimization leads to a distortion in producers’ decisions.16 
Second, it is always optimal to allow for national policies, that is, to 
decentralize part or all of the provision of incentives. This ensures that the burden of 
providing incentives is shared among the different regulation entities. How it is 
shared depends on the size of the spillover effects and on the degree of national 
regulators’ bargaining power, that is, their degree of capture. Two extreme cases can 
be distinguished: 
• When the NRAs are totally independent from the regulated TSOs, they leave no 
rent during the bargaining process with the TSO they regulate. As the ERA suffers 
from an informational disadvantage to the NRAs, it cannot do better than the 
NRAs. The ERA only determines compensatory transfers between member states, 
so as to make them internalize the externalities their TSOs bring about. The task 
of inducing TSOs to take efficient decisions at the Community level is entirely left 
to the NRAs (this is not true, however, in case of partial capture). 
• If the TSOs have some bargaining power, they are able to extract rents in the 
national negotiation framework. Once the Community and the national objectives 
are made compatible by transfers between member states, the ERA should 
influence the national negotiations so as to minimize the rent extracted by the 
TSOs. The capacity of the ERA to modify the status quo options in national 
negotiation processes is Pareto-improving for the Community. Then, full 
decentralization is not optimal despite the ERA’s informational handicap.  
Full decentralization can also be optimal as long as spillover effects are not too 
large, or more precisely as long as the TSOs’ hidden actions that create spillover 
effects are below a certain threshold. Indeed, as long as the TSOs’ decisions have 
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small impacts on the welfare of neighboring countries, the subsidiarity considerations 
prevail. But in the case of large positive spillover effects, a supranational direct 
incentive policy will be desirable, complemented by the control of the better-
informed NRAs. 
Instead of a totally independent ERA, it is not uncommon for the electricity 
transport sector to be characterized by some degree of capture because the NRAs 
have to find compromises with both the TSOs and the national governments. This 
leads us to conclude that the Third Energy Package makes sense. First, the creation of 
the ACER will help to limit the bargaining power of the TSOs. Moreover, by 
enhancing the NRAs’ powers, the Third Package will help mitigate capture, making 
efficiency reachable at a lower cost. This reinforcement of the NRAs is not in 
contradiction with the function of the ACER.  
The future of the sector’s complex regulatory structure depends on the 
capacity of the ERA to extract information from the NRAs. If the latter were obliged 
to transmit to the former all the information they have on the TSOs they regulate, the 
ACER would have all the advantages of a supranational entity (that is, the 
internalization of spillover effects and no risk of capture) without the informational 
gap that can impair its decision-making process. 
 
4.2 The Regulation of International TSOs  
In this section, we consider the possibility of mergers between national TSOs, which 
would lead to the creation of international TSOs. Then we discuss potential 
regulatory relationships between such international TSOs and international and 
national regulators. 
4.2.1 International TSOs 
Several new trends urge the contemplation of international TSOs. To begin, even 
though unbundling the ownership of production and transport assets is not yet 
compulsory after much debate during the elaboration of the Third Energy Package, 
European authorities continue to put pressure on vertically integrated national 
incumbents. Furthermore, the creation of a Europe-wide TSOs’ association as well as 
the further development of regional initiatives can be seen as preliminary to the 
creation of international TSOs.  
Unbundling 
The proponents of unbundling maintain that when a handful of vertically integrated 
firms control the market, there are few incentives both to provide access to new 
entrants and to invest in network capacity. Unbundling would thus enable more 
competition and bring prices (and profits) down. To curtail the power of the energy 
giants, the European Council and the European Parliament encourage the effective 
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separation of generation and transmission assets as an efficient step toward 
promoting investment in infrastructure, fair access to the grid, and transparency.  
The proposals for ownership unbundling faced strong opposition during the 
negotiations of the Third Energy Package. Eventually, the members of the European 
Parliament signed a deal that allows companies to choose among three alternative 
models: ownership unbundling (adopted by Italy, Spain and the UK among others), 
independent system operator (ISO) like for example in Scotland, California and 
Midwest, and independent transmission operator (ITO). In the ISO model, large 
vertically integrated companies are allowed to retain ownership of their electric grids 
under the condition that decisions regarding the system (ancillary services, 
investments…) are made by an independent entity. In the ITO model chosen by 
France and Germany, integrated companies keep making commercial and investment 
decisions but have to set up a framework to guarantee the independent operation of 
the electricity system as well as the transmission network.  
Full unbundling still has powerful supporters, particularly among the 
members of the parliament and among commissioners.17 Consequently, we can 
imagine that, sooner or later, ownership unbundling will become the rule all around 
the EU, so that most of the TSOs will operate as independent entities. Then, 
considering a case in which European neighboring TSOs are fully separated from 
energy producers on ownership grounds will no longer be just another academic 
exercise. As independent national monopolies emit and consume positive and 
negative externalities to and from their neighbors, they have some incentive to merge 
on a regional basis. Merging would increase the efficiency of the investment and 
operational decisions in those countries where energy externalities are at work, as 
well as allow them to benefit from economies of scope and scale, for example, in the 
management of maintenance teams. Some recent examples illustrate a new trend in 
cross-border mergers: in February 2010, the German operator E.ON sold about 
10,700 kilometers of German transmission line to the Netherlander TENNET. In 
March 2010, the Swedish operator VATTENFALL announced its will to part with its 
East Germany network, eventually acquired by the Belgian ELIA. In July 2010 it was 
EDF’s turn to part with its three British distribution grids, bought by a Hong Kong 
consortium.  
ENTSO-E 
In 1999 the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO) association was 
created. It aims to harmonize the disparate guidelines for grid access and use. On 
June 29, 2001, the ETSO gathered 32 independent TSO companies from the 15 
countries of the EU plus Norway and Switzerland. Nevertheless, such voluntary 
cooperation has been proven limited by blackouts and other incidents resulting from 
either a lack of coordination or the absence of needed connections.  
Consequently, the Third Energy Package created a Europe-wide TSO 
organization to harmonize access and operating rules, exchange information, and 
coordinate investment plans to build an integrated market. This organization is also 
                                                 
17
 For a discussion of the economic pros and cons, see Pollitt (2007) 
 12 
in charge of elaborating the 10-year network development plan (TYNDP). Agreement 
did not have to wait until the new legislation was adopted. On December 28, 2008, 
the 40 European TSOs spontaneously signed an agreement establishing the new 
structure, and the ENTSO-E was born. Existing associations such as the ETSO have 
been dissolved and their tasks integrated into the new organization. 
Regional Initiatives 
In February 2006, the ERGEG launched the Electricity Regional Initiative (ERI). 
Seven regional electricity markets have been created in Europe: Baltic, Central East, 
Central South, Central West, Northern, South West, and France-UK-Ireland. With 
the ERI’s launch operating and commercial standards will be further coordinated.  
The Central Western ERI is the most advanced initiative thanks to the creation 
of CORESO and the Capacity Allocation Service System (CASC-CWE). CORESO 
provides real time and D-1 forecasts about the security of the Central Western 
networks to the TSOs in France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Furthermore, CORESO contributes to the building process of the CWE 
regional market coupling by supplying merged files representing two-day ahead 
forecasts. Meanwhile, the CASC is a joint cross-border service company in charge of 
services related to the auctioning of power transmission capacities on the common 
borders of France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Behaving 
as a single TSO on the European market, the CASC increases the liquidity within the 
five markets through the standardization of computer systems and procedures. As 
such, it is an important step toward the merger of the five markets into a common 
regional electricity market.  
Given the observed momentum toward the creation of international TSOs or 
alliances of national TSOs, an unchanged regulatory framework would lead to big 
firms engaged in different activities, with cross-border transmission regulated by as 
many NRAs as the countries they are engaged in. Under which conditions would it be 
socially preferable to have one single supranational regulator entity facing 
international TSOs, rather than several NRAs? Given the social gains at stake, 
international TSOs and their regulatory framework deserve some attention.  
4.2.2 The Regulation Design of International TSOs 
We examine some of the potential problems created by the regulation of international 
TSOs using a model developed by Laffont and Pouyet (2003).  
Modeling the Regulation of an International TSO 
Hierarchical structure and informational gap 
The alternative regulatory structures contemplated by Laffont and Pouyet (2003) 
bring to light some possible organizational features of the electricity transport sector 
in the near future. The players are (i) one international monopoly (an international 
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TSO) engaged in two countries. (ii) either one supranational regulator (ERA) for the 
two countries or two national independent regulators (NRAs), all facing asymmetrical 
information; and (iii) households living in the two countries who are simultaneously 
consumers, taxpayers, shareholders, and lobbyists. Notice that the supranational 
regulator could be the ACER as well as a joint assembly of the two national 
regulators.  
The TSO incurs two costs, each associated with its activity in one of the two 
countries where it operates. Each cost has an intrinsic part perfectly known by the 
TSO but only known in probability by the regulator(s). Contrary to Caillaud, Jullien, 
and Picard (1996), for whom the NRAs had an informational advantage over the ERA, 
here, the national and supranational regulators bear the same informational 
asymmetry with respect to the TSO. The intrinsic cost of the TSO can be reduced by a 
specific effort that is not observable by the regulator(s). Nevertheless, the regulators 
can observe the resulting cost in each country, making this a case of “false moral 
hazard.”18 The regulator(s) actually face an adverse selection problem.  
Costs, profits, and surplus 
At the core of the analysis is the form of the cost function (or disutility function) of 
the two levels of effort incurred by the TSO. The authors assume that the cost-
reducing efforts 1e  in country 1 and 2e  in country 2 create a disutility to the firm equal 
to ( ) ( )2 21 2 1 2 1 21, 2e e e e e eψ γ= + + . The marginal disutility of ie , 
( )1 2,
i j
i
e e
e e
e
ψ γ∂ = +
∂
, 
increases (or decreases) with je  if 0γ >  ( 0γ < ). Only the case where 0γ >  is 
analyzed. The authors focus on the case in which operating in country 1 or in country 
2 are substitutable activities.19 Applied to the cross-border transmission sector, such 
an assumption could be legitimated if the TSO had a limited common resource that 
could be dedicated to reducing the operation costs in the two countries.  
The TSO’s profit is equal to the sum of the transfers from either the two national 
regulators or from the ERA (including the reimbursement of costs), minus the 
disutility of the efforts.  
In country i, the objective of the national regulator is made of the surplus created by 
the activity of the TSO in i, plus the share of the TSO’s profit incurred to country i’s 
shareholders, minus the operating cost and the net transfer paid to the TSO, 
corrected by the cost of public funds. Two important ingredients of the NRAs’ 
                                                 
18
 See Laffont and Martimort (2002: 287). Specifically, if C eθ= −  , where θ  stands for the intrinsic cost and 
e  for the level of effort, the observation of C  by the regulator allows us to treat the problem as a pure adverse 
selection model. Indeed, not observing the action e is the same as not observing the parameter θ . 
19
 For a more general analysis of multiprincipals where the agent has either substitutable or complementary 
activities, see Martimort (1992: 14). The limitation to the case 0γ >  comes from the necessity to keep 
( )1 2,
i
e e
e
ψ∂
∂
 positive for all je . Nevertheless, in the case of symmetrical effort 1 2e e= , a weak complementarity 
condition 1γ > −  is sufficient to meet both the condition of positive marginal disutility and the condition of 
convexity of the disutility. 
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objective functions are the cost of public funds and the proportion of the TSO’s 
capital owned by households in the two countries.  
One or Two Regulation Agencies? 
If information is spread evenly (that is, in the case of perfect information), it does not 
matter if we centralize the regulation mechanism or leave the two independent 
agencies to run it. This is because the only “externality” of the model appears in the 
disutility function, which is internalized by the TSO. When information is 
asymmetrical, political economy distortions are central to the regulation design. We 
first contrast the relative advantages and drawbacks of centralization and 
decentralization when economic regulation is not affected by political concerns. We 
then consider the case of a random majority creating political uncertainty. 
Political stability and centralization 
What can we expect under the centralization regime? With one single regulator only 
knowing the distribution of probabilities of cost the TSO keeps the control of its level 
of effort as we illustrate in figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2 Relationships among the players in the centralized regulation regime 
 
Note: ERA = European regulation agency; TSO = transmission system operator. 
Then efforts are distorted downwards in comparison with the perfect information 
case. Indeed, facing a disadvantage in cost information relative to the TSO, the 
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regulator has to leave some rents to the TSO to induce cost-reducing efforts. As the 
rents are socially costly, the ERA faces the standard trade-off between rent and 
efficiency. All firms, except the most inefficient one, earn a positive rent. 
Political stability and decentralization 
We now consider the interactions between the NRAs’ policies when regulation is 
decentralized. As we illustrate it in figure 4.3, each NRA knows, but cannot control, 
the fact that the other NRA’s policy affects the relation it has with the TSO. It means 
that each NRA designs its regulation mechanism constrained not only by the 
informational opportunism of the TSO but also by the expected decision of the other 
NRA. To put it in a nutshell, regulators compete with one another to extract efficiency 
from a firm without leaving it too much rent.  
 
Figure 4.3 Relationships among the players in the decentralized regulation regime 
 
Note: NRA = national regulation agency; TSO = transmission system operator. 
Two effects are at work: first, the “shared-rent effect,” which is a consequence 
of the ownership structure of the TSO. In each country, some citizens hold shares of 
the firm. Consequently, the informational rent is split between the two countries, 
depending on where the shareholders are. Under decentralization, each NRA only 
takes into account the welfare of the agents belonging to its jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the NRAs undervalue the welfare induced by their policy, and they 
implement very low effort levels. Second, under decentralization, each NRA designs 
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its optimal incentive policy to make the monopoly behave in its national interest. It 
does not take into account the fact that each regulation also modifies the incentive 
relationships between the firm and the other regulator. As the efforts are substitutes, 
the NRAs propose high-powered incentive contracts, which lead to very high effort 
levels. This situation is the result of the “competition effect.” 
The level of effort in the decentralized framework can be larger or smaller than in the 
centralized one depending on the strength of each effect. Laffont and Pouyet (2003) 
show that the higher the substitution coefficient γ  the more likely it is that the 
competition effect will overpass the shared-rent effect. Effort is distorted upward, and 
the rent abandoned to the TSO is ranked accordingly. The opposite occurs if γ  is 
small, in particular if 0γ = . If the latter holds, there is no competition effect, and 
effort is distorted downward. 
Political uncertainty 
The level of effort is only one aspect of the performance of a regulation mechanism. A 
high level of effort can be too costly in terms of abandoned rents. Then, is 
centralization better than decentralization on welfare grounds? Using a model of 
random majority of shareholders, (the majority of shareholders might be either in 
one country or in the other) Laffont and Pouyet (2003) construct an example in 
which political economy distortions may favor decentralization. Random majority 
generates a fluctuation in the interest group that captures the regulatory decision, 
which leads to trade-offs between rent extraction and efficiency. The analysis is built 
on the following timing:  
• The constitution decides which regulatory structure (centralized or decentralized) 
to set up in the two regions. 
• In each country a random fraction of households become shareholders. 
• The regulators in charge build a social objective function that depends on the 
majority in place.  
The last hypothesis means that under decentralization, if there is a majority of 
shareholders among the households in country i, the NRA of i only takes into account 
the surplus of the shareholders in i and the part of the rent of the TSO that accrues to 
those shareholders. On the contrary, when the shareholders do not hold the majority 
in country i, the NRA in i only cares about the surplus of the nonshareholders. Under 
centralization, the unique regulator cares only about the majority in both countries. 
A comparative analysis of welfare levels20 shows that centralization suffers 
from policy fluctuations whereas competition between NRAs mitigates them, though 
at the cost of high-powered incentives. Consequently, centralization is preferred to 
decentralization if the shadow cost of public funds is larger than a given value. The 
converse is true when the shadow cost of public funds is below another value. 
Between these two thresholds, decentralization (centralization) is preferred to 
centralization (decentralization) when the size of the majority is small (large). The 
role of the cost of public funds is not surprising since, when this cost is high, it is 
                                                 
20
 This part of the analysis is based on the hypothesis that γ  is large, which means, as seen above, that the 
competition effect is larger than the shared-rent effect. 
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socially costly to abandon a rent to the TSO. The role of the majority of shareholders 
is more surprising. The drawback of centralization is that the unique regulator cares 
only about the overall majority in both countries. When the size of the majority is 
small (larger than but close to 50 percent), the proportion of consumers 
disadvantaged by the centralized regulator tends to be relatively large, and 
decentralization becomes the preferred choice even though it provides the firm with 
too much rent. Decentralization serves to limit the discretionary power of the 
regulators.21 
Economic and Political Lessons 
Following Laffont and Pouyet (2003), we can conclude that the mere existence of an 
international TSO is not sufficient for installing an international regulator. The 
optimal regulatory regime depends on the cost of public funds, on the technology of 
the TSO (the degree of substitutability of efforts devoted to the various countries), 
and on the degree of political uncertainty. Indeed, when the NRAs are captured (that 
is, when the national agencies act in favor of the randomly determined majority in 
power), decentralization might be preferable as it reduces the discretionary power of 
the decision makers.  
The model brings to light some of the economic problems that might arise if an 
ERA is installed with all the powers of the NRAs. It also provides important political 
lessons. In particular, it reminds us that the social utility function that traditionally 
gives equal weights to consumers and shareholders should be reconsidered in the 
context of international regulation. Indeed, consumers and shareholders do not 
necessarily live in the same country, so the NRAs do not fully internalize the effects of 
their domestic regulation. Additionally, the regulation institutions have been 
installed for a long time, while regulators are influenced by lobbyists who come and 
go with elections. Clearly, an ERA would be less sensitive to this form of capture, 
which means that its regulatory decisions would depart from the national interests.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The chapter has assessed the current regulatory structure of the cross-border 
transmission sector. Based on Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard (1996), we have seen that 
moral hazard and potential capture are sources of TSO rents. The trade-off between 
full efficiency and rent minimization leads to a distortion in TSO decisions. 
Furthermore, it is always optimal to allow national policies, that is, to decentralize 
part or all of the provision of incentives. This shares the burden of providing 
incentives among different regulation entities. The way it is shared depends on the 
size of the spillover effects and on the degree of national regulators’ bargaining 
power, that is, the degree of capture of national regulators. 
                                                 
21
 This is in line with the results obtained by Martimort (1996). 
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Considering new trends such as the increasing number of unbundled 
incumbents and what could be viewed as preliminary steps toward the formation of 
international TSOs (for example, ENTSO-E and the development of regional 
initiatives), we have discussed how the relationships between international TSOs and 
national and European regulators could evolve. Based on Laffont and Pouyet (2003), 
we have seen that the optimal regulatory regime depends not only on the existence of 
an international TSO but on the cost of public funds, on the technology of the TSO 
(the degree of substitutability of efforts devoted to the different countries), and on the 
degree of political uncertainty. Indeed, when the NRAs may be captured (that is, 
when they act in favor of the randomly determined majority in power), 
decentralization might be preferable as it reduces the discretionary power of the 
decision makers.  
It is possible to go still deeper into the issue of regulating cross-border 
electricity transmission. Indeed, our conclusions show that special attention has to be 
paid to the governance of the ACER to prevent the European regulator from being 
captured. Furthermore, the problem of “missing money” due to the presence of 
externalities is an issue that could be dealt with in future research. This problem can 
be summarized as follows: tariffs and congestion rents are not large enough to foster 
further investment in interconnections. The reason is that while cross-border 
infrastructure projects are mainly financed by the countries they interconnect, they 
generate positive externalities that benefit more countries. Consequently, the TSOs 
should be paid by all the agents who benefit from the network. The European 
Community has tried to tackle this problem through the Trans-European Energy 
Network and the ITC scheme. The measurement of the externalities generated by 
interconnections is at stake. Besides a lack of adequate financing schemes, the 
development of interconnections is slowed by heterogeneous national administrative 
and technical procedures. This hurdle could be lowered by a powerful international 
regulation entity. 
Interconnections are fundamental for the development of electricity 
production from renewable sources. Indeed, renewables are not evenly available 
across the EU. Additionally, wind power and photovoltaic power are intermittent 
sources. Combined with the development of smart grids, stronger interconnections 
would allow more efficient and reliable dispatch at the international level. But 
renewable sources of electricity production are not yet mature and necessitate public 
subsidies. The multiprincipals theory and the subsidiarity principle could be applied 
in studying the interaction between national and European policies to subsidize green 
energy.22  
                                                 
22
 On this theme, see Eichner and Pethig (2010). 
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